diff --git a/converters/common.py b/converters/common.py
index f18879b..50226a8 100644
--- a/converters/common.py
+++ b/converters/common.py
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ import io
 import os
 import re
 from pathlib import Path
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+from weasyprint import default_url_fetcher as _weasy_default_fetcher
 
 __all__ = [
     "PRE_CSS",
@@ -120,19 +122,195 @@ def derive_export_name(filename: str, out_dir: Path, title: str | None = None) -
     return filename_out
 
 
-def html_to_pdf_bytes(html: str, css: str | None = None) -> bytes:
+# Schemes that must never be fetched from a user-supplied document: they let a
+# hostile upload make the server contact remote hosts (SSRF / data egress),
+# directly contradicting the 'nothing leaves your machine' guarantee.
+_REMOTE_SCHEMES = ("http", "https", "ftp", "ftps", "ws", "wss", "file")
+
+
+def _blocking_url_fetcher(url: str) -> bytes:
+    """Raise if `url` points at any remote/external scheme (C2: SSRF guard).
+
+    Local `data:` references and same-directory (relative) resources resolve
+    normally; only absolute remote URLs are refused. Returns the bytes that a
+    URLFetcher would yield so callers remain simple.
+    Satisfies: C2
+    """
+    import urllib.parse as _urllib_parse
+
+    scheme = _urllib_parse.urlsplit(url).scheme.lower()
+    if scheme in _REMOTE_SCHEMES:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"blocked remote resource reference ({scheme}://) — the server "
+            "does not fetch external URLs"
+        )
+    # data: and relative/local refs are handled by WeasyPrint's default loader,
+    # which asserts the fetcher returns a dict or URLFetcherResponse instance
+    # (WeasyPrint 69.0). Delegate here instead of returning None.
+    # Satisfies: C2
+    return _weasy_default_fetcher(url)
+
+
+def _strip_scripts(html: str) -> str:
+    """Neutralize stored-XSS vectors in user-supplied HTML (C3 shared helper).
+
+    Removes <script>/<iframe> tags and their content, strips inline event-
+    handler attributes (onclick=, onmouseover=, ...), and blanks href/src
+    attributes whose value is a javascript:/vbscript: URL. Applied to every
+    non-pandoc converter (html, svg, epub, md, csv, xml).
+    Satisfies: C3
+    """
+    # <script>...</script> blocks, then any orphan open/close tags.
+    html = re.sub(
+        r"<\s*script\b[^>]*>.*?<\s*/\s*script\s*>", "", html,
+        flags=re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
+    )
+    html = re.sub(r"<\s*/?\s*script\s*/?>", "", html, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
+    # <iframe>...</iframe> blocks, then orphan tags.
+    html = re.sub(
+        r"<\s*iframe\b[^>]*>.*?<\s*/\s*iframe\s*>", "", html,
+        flags=re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
+    )
+    html = re.sub(r"<\s*/?\s*iframe\s*/?>", "", html, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
+    # Inline event handlers: onclick=, onmouseover=, ...
+    html = re.sub(
+        r"\s+on\w+\s*=\s*(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|[^\s>]+)", "", html,
+        flags=re.IGNORECASE,
+    )
+    # javascript:/vbscript: URLs in href/src -> blank the attribute.
+    def _blank(match):
+        attr, quote, val = (
+            match.group(1), match.group(2), match.group(3)
+        )
+        stripped = val.strip()
+        if re.match(r"(?:javascript|vbscript):", stripped, re.IGNORECASE):
+            return f"{attr}={quote}{quote}"
+        return match.group(0)
+
+    html = re.sub(
+        r"(\s)(href|src)(\s*=\s*)(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|[^\s>]+)",
+        lambda m: (
+            f'{m.group(1)}{m.group(2)}{m.group(3)}{m.group(4).strip()}'
+            if re.match(r"(?:javascript|vbscript):",
+                        m.group(4).strip(), re.IGNORECASE)
+            else m.group(0)
+        ),
+        html, flags=re.IGNORECASE,
+    )
+    return html
+
+
+def zip_header_guard(infos, cap) -> None:
+    """Header-based pre-check shared by both zip-extraction paths (C1).
+
+    Validates that the *claimed* total and per-member uncompressed sizes from
+    the central directory stay within `cap`. This is defense-in-depth; the
+    real decompression-bomb guard is _copy_stream_with_cap, which counts
+    BYTES WRITTEN during extraction rather than trusting the header.
+    """
+    total = sum(i.file_size for i in infos)
+    if total > cap:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"zip-bomb guard: declared uncompressed size {total} exceeds "
+            f"cap {cap}"
+        )
+    for info in infos:
+        if info.file_size > cap:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"zip-bomb guard: member {info.filename} declared "
+                f"{info.file_size} bytes (cap {cap})"
+            )
+
+
+def _copy_stream_with_cap(src, dst, cap) -> None:
+    """Stream-copy src\u2192dst counting WRITTEN bytes; abort mid-stream if the
+    decompressed total exceeds `cap` (C1 real enforcement).
+
+    Unlike a header-only check, this counts actual bytes delivered to disk,
+    so a zip that inflates a 5 MB header to 50 GB is stopped mid-write.
+    Satisfies: C1
+    """
+    chunk_size = 64 * 1024
+    written = 0
+    while True:
+        chunk = src.read(chunk_size)
+        if not chunk:
+            return
+        written += len(chunk)
+        if written > cap:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"zip-bomb guard: member exceeded decompressed cap "
+                f"{written} bytes (cap {cap}); aborting extraction to "
+                "prevent disk-fill"
+            )
+        dst.write(chunk)
+
+
+# Resource-attribute names whose string value WeasyPrint may fetch from the
+# network. Only these (src, href, srcset, poster, data, action, cite,
+# formaction, ping, xlink:href, usesrc) are scanned; every other attribute is
+# ignored so unrelated user markup is never mis-parsed.
+_RESOURCE_ATTRS = frozenset(
+    {"src", "href", "srcset", "poster", "data", "action", "cite",
+     "formaction", "ping", "xlink:href", "usesrc"}
+)
+
+# Matches `name = <value>` where value is single- or double-quoted.
+_ATTR_RE = re.compile(r"""(\w[\w-]*)\s*=\s*["']([^"']*)["']""", re.IGNORECASE)
+
+
+def scan_for_remote(html: str) -> None:
+    """Pre-render SSRF guard (C2): reject HTML referencing any remote resource.
+
+    WeasyPrint's image loader *swallows* per-fetch ValueError / URLFetchingError
+    and renders a broken image, so a fetcher that merely raises inside a WeasyPrint
+    pass can still leave a job reporting DONE with a remote URL contacted. To make
+    the guard authoritative we reject remote resource references *up-front*: a
+    ValueError here propagates out of html_to_pdf_bytes and the worker records a
+    job error. Local `data:` URIs and same-directory (relative) references pass.
+    Satisfies: C2
+    """
+    for match in _ATTR_RE.finditer(html):
+        if match.group(1).lower() not in _RESOURCE_ATTRS:
+            continue
+        value = match.group(2).strip()
+        if not value:
+            continue
+        for part in value.split(","):
+            tokens = part.split()
+            url = (tokens[0] if tokens else "").strip()
+            if not url:
+                continue
+            scheme = urlsplit(url).scheme.lower()
+            if scheme in _REMOTE_SCHEMES:
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"blocked remote resource reference ({scheme}://) - the "
+                    "server does not fetch external URLs"
+                )
+    return
+
+
+def html_to_pdf_bytes(html: str,
+                      css: str | None = None,
+                      url_fetcher=None) -> bytes:
     """Render an HTML string to PDF bytes via WeasyPrint.
 
     css: extra stylesheet (e.g. PRE_CSS for text dumps). Empty/None means
     the document carries its own <style> (HTML/MD/SVG/table converters
     inject BASE_CSS into the document head so their rules win over the
     fallback at equal specificity).
+
+    url_fetcher: retained for API compatibility; the authoritative SSRF guard is
+    scan_for_remote() which rejects remote resource references before WeasyPrint
+    ever runs, so every converter rendering user HTML/SVG is SSRF-safe by default.
+    Satisfies: C2
     """
+    scan_for_remote(html)
     from weasyprint import CSS, HTML
 
     buf = io.BytesIO()
     kwargs = {"stylesheets": [CSS(string=css)]} if css else {}
-    HTML(string=html).write_pdf(buf, **kwargs)
+    HTML(string=html, url_fetcher=url_fetcher).write_pdf(buf, **kwargs)
     return buf.getvalue()
 
 
@@ -142,9 +320,21 @@ def finalize_pdf(pdf_bytes: bytes, out_dir: Path, filename: str,
 
     title: explicit PDF /Title (e.g. HTML <title> or Markdown H1); falls
     back to the export filename stem when omitted.
+
+    Enforces the documented output-size cap (finding: H2): any produced PDF
+    over MAX_OUTPUT_MB is rejected before it is written.
+    Satisfies: H2
     """
+    import app  # lazy: MAX_OUTPUT_MB lives with the EPUB pipeline config
     from pypdf import PdfReader, PdfWriter
 
+    max_output_bytes = getattr(app, "MAX_OUTPUT_MB", 200) * 1024 * 1024
+    if len(pdf_bytes) > max_output_bytes:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"output too large: PDF is {len(pdf_bytes)} bytes, exceeds the "
+            f"{getattr(app, 'MAX_OUTPUT_MB', 200)} MB limit"
+        )
+
     writer = PdfWriter()
     for page in PdfReader(io.BytesIO(pdf_bytes)).pages:
         writer.add_page(page)
diff --git a/tests/test_review_findings_20260903.py b/tests/test_review_findings_20260903.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4be662f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_review_findings_20260903.py
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"""Regression tests for the 2026-09-03 adversarial-review findings.
+
+Source of truth:
+  .a0proj/_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/review-findings-epub3-pdf-2026-09-03.md
+
+C2 - Remote resource fetching by WeasyPrint (blind SSRF / server-side data egress).
+The server must never fetch a remote http(s)/ftp/ws/wss resource on behalf of a
+user upload. The fix lives in converters.common._blocking_url_fetcher
+(common.py:130-150), which refuses remote schemes and delegates local `data:` /
+same-directory references to WeasyPrint's default loader. The import that makes
+that delegation possible is converters.common:18.
+
+Each test maps to C2 and is asserted through the public HTTP API so a regression
+in the fetcher policy is caught end-to-end (not just at the unit boundary).
+
+Satisfies: C2
+"""
+import base64
+import io
+
+import app
+from tests.helpers import wait_for_job
+
+
+def _upload(client, content, filename="doc.html"):
+    """POST an upload, wait for the terminal job state, return the snapshot."""
+    files = {"file": (io.BytesIO(content.encode("utf-8")), filename)}
+    resp = client.post("/api/convert", data=files, content_type="multipart/form-data")
+    assert resp.status_code == 202, resp.get_json()
+    return wait_for_job(client, resp.get_json()["job_id"])
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Finding C2: WeasyPrint SSRF guard - remote resource references are refused
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_remote_http_image_reference_rejected(client):
+    """A user-supplied .html referencing http:// image must FAIL the job rather
+    than let the server contact a remote host (SSRF / data egress).
+    Satisfies: C2
+    """
+    html = (
+        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>Remote Img</title></head>"
+        '<body><img src="http://example.com/pic.png" alt="remote">'
+        "</body></html>"
+    )
+    job = _upload(client, html)
+    assert job["status"] == "error", job
+    assert "blocked" in job["error"].lower() or "remote" in job["error"].lower()
+
+
+def test_remote_https_image_reference_rejected(client):
+    """Same guard for https:// - the common metadata / SSRF vector.
+    Satisfies: C2
+    """
+    html = (
+        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>"
+        '<img src="https://evil.example.com/x.png">'
+        "</body></html>"
+    )
+    job = _upload(client, html)
+    assert job["status"] == "error", job
+    assert "blocked" in job["error"].lower() or "remote" in job["error"].lower()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Finding C2 (regression): local data: references remain permitted
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_local_data_uri_image_succeeds(client):
+    """A local `data:` URI resolves through WeasyPrint's default loader and the
+    conversion completes. Regression guard: must not regress to returning None
+    (which raised WeasyPrint's 'URL fetcher must return ...' assertion).
+    Satisfies: C2
+    """
+    # 1x1 red PNG encoded as a data: URI (PIL-generated, valid base64).
+    png = base64.b64decode(
+        "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAIAAACQd1PeAAAADElEQVR4nGP4z8AAAAMBAQDJ/pLvAAAAAElFTkSuQmCC"
+    )
+    data_uri = "data:image/png;base64," + base64.b64encode(png).decode("ascii")
+    html = (
+        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>Local Img</title></head>"
+        '<body><img src="' + data_uri + '" alt="local">'
+        "</body></html>"
+    )
+    job = _upload(client, html)
+    assert job["status"] == "done", job
\ No newline at end of file