"""Regression tests for the 2026-09-03 adversarial-review findings.

Source of truth:
  .a0proj/_bmad-output/implementation-artifacts/review-findings-epub3-pdf-2026-09-03.md

C2 - Remote resource fetching by WeasyPrint (blind SSRF / server-side data egress).
The server must never fetch a remote http(s)/ftp/ws/wss resource on behalf of a
user upload. The fix lives in converters.common._blocking_url_fetcher
(common.py:130-150), which refuses remote schemes and delegates local `data:` /
same-directory references to WeasyPrint's default loader. The import that makes
that delegation possible is converters.common:18.

Each test maps to C2 and is asserted through the public HTTP API so a regression
in the fetcher policy is caught end-to-end (not just at the unit boundary).

Satisfies: C2
"""
import base64
import io
import os
import tempfile
import zipfile

import pytest

import app
import converters.common as C
from tests.helpers import wait_for_job, download_bytes, pdf_text


def _upload(client, content, filename="doc.html"):
    """POST an upload, wait for the terminal job state, return the snapshot.

    Accepts either a str (encoded to utf-8) or bytes so the HTML/SVG string
    tests and the binary-epub C1 zip-bomb test can both share it.
    """
    if isinstance(content, str):
        content = content.encode("utf-8")
    files = {"file": (io.BytesIO(content), filename)}
    resp = client.post("/api/convert", data=files, content_type="multipart/form-data")
    assert resp.status_code == 202, resp.get_json()
    return wait_for_job(client, resp.get_json()["job_id"])


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Finding C2: WeasyPrint SSRF guard - remote resource references are refused
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

def test_remote_http_image_reference_rejected(client):
    """A user-supplied .html referencing http:// image must FAIL the job rather
    than let the server contact a remote host (SSRF / data egress).
    Satisfies: C2
    """
    html = (
        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>Remote Img</title></head>"
        '<body><img src="http://example.com/pic.png" alt="remote">'
        "</body></html>"
    )
    job = _upload(client, html)
    assert job["status"] == "error", job
    assert "blocked" in job["error"].lower() or "remote" in job["error"].lower()


def test_remote_https_image_reference_rejected(client):
    """Same guard for https:// - the common metadata / SSRF vector.
    Satisfies: C2
    """
    html = (
        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>"
        '<img src="https://evil.example.com/x.png">'
        "</body></html>"
    )
    job = _upload(client, html)
    assert job["status"] == "error", job
    assert "blocked" in job["error"].lower() or "remote" in job["error"].lower()


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Finding C2 (regression): local data: references remain permitted
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

def test_local_data_uri_image_succeeds(client):
    """A local `data:` URI resolves through WeasyPrint's default loader and the
    conversion completes. Regression guard: must not regress to returning None
    (which raised WeasyPrint's 'URL fetcher must return ...' assertion).
    Satisfies: C2
    """
    # 1x1 red PNG encoded as a data: URI (PIL-generated, valid base64).
    png = base64.b64decode(
        "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAIAAACQd1PeAAAADElEQVR4nGP4z8AAAAMBAQDJ/pLvAAAAAElFTkSuQmCC"
    )
    data_uri = "data:image/png;base64," + base64.b64encode(png).decode("ascii")
    html = (
        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>Local Img</title></head>"
        '<body><img src="' + data_uri + '" alt="local">'
        "</body></html>"
    )
    job = _upload(client, html)
    assert job["status"] == "done", job


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Finding C1 (regression): decompression-bomb guard on zip extraction
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Two independent mechanisms are exercised:
#   * the SHARED streaming guard common._copy_stream_with_cap (proven by the
#     unit tests: it counts WRITTEN decompressed bytes and aborts mid-stream
#     past the cap), and
#   * app.py's zip-bomb guard end-to-end (proven by the e2e: a genuinely large
#     member trips the per-member size cap and the job fails with 'zip-bomb').


def _append_member(epub_bytes, name, data=b"x", external_attr=None):
    """Append a member to an existing epub byte string (mirrors test_review_fixes.py)."""
    src = io.BytesIO(epub_bytes)
    out = io.BytesIO()
    with zipfile.ZipFile(src, "r") as zin, zipfile.ZipFile(out, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zout:
        for item in zin.namelist():
            zout.writestr(item, zin.read(item))
        zi = zipfile.ZipInfo(name)
        if external_attr is not None:
            zi.external_attr = external_attr
        zout.writestr(zi, data)
    return out.getvalue()


def test_copy_stream_with_cap_counts_written_bytes():
    """_copy_stream_with_cap returns the exact byte count it streamed to dst.
    Satisfies: C1
    """
    data = b"x" * (10 * 1024)  # 10 KiB
    buf = io.BytesIO()
    written = C._copy_stream_with_cap(io.BytesIO(data), buf, cap=10 * 1024 * 1024)
    assert written == len(data)
    assert buf.getvalue() == data


def test_copy_stream_with_cap_count_only_when_dst_none():
    """When dst is None the bytes are counted but NOT written (used by the pandoc
    pre-check, which must not touch disk). Satisfies: C1
    """
    data = b"x" * (10 * 1024)
    written = C._copy_stream_with_cap(io.BytesIO(data), None, cap=10 * 1024 * 1024)
    assert written == len(data)


def test_copy_stream_with_cap_aborts_on_overflow():
    """_copy_stream_with_cap raises a zip-bomb guard error mid-stream when the
    decompressed total exceeds the cap - the real decompression-bomb protection.
    Satisfies: C1
    """
    data = b"x" * (10 * 1024)  # 10 KiB
    with pytest.raises(ValueError) as excinfo:
        C._copy_stream_with_cap(io.BytesIO(data), None, cap=1024)  # 1 KiB cap
    assert "zip-bomb" in str(excinfo.value).lower()


def test_c1_zip_bomb_guard_rejects_large_member(client, fixture_epub_bytes, monkeypatch):
    """A genuinely large member (ZIP_BOMB_MIN_CAP) fails the job with a 'zip-bomb'
    error through the public HTTP API. Production floor is 2 GiB (impractical in a
    unit test), so the floor is shrunk so the guard logic is exercised with a 4 MiB
    member in a ~8 KiB upload. Satisfies: C1
    """
    monkeypatch.setattr(app, "ZIP_BOMB_MIN_CAP", 1024 * 1024)  # 1 MiB floor
    large = b"\x00" * (4 * 1024 * 1024)  # 4 MiB of NUL bytes, exceeds the 1 MiB cap
    content = _append_member(fixture_epub_bytes, "OEBPS/bomb.bin", large)
    job = _upload(client, content, "bomb.epub")
    assert job["status"] == "error", job
    assert "zip-bomb" in job["error"].lower()


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Finding C3 (regression): stored-XSS stripping in rendered HTML/SVG
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WeasyPrint already drops <script> content and event-handler attribute VALUES from
# rendered PDF *text* (confirmed empirically), so 'script absent from the PDF' is NOT
# by itself a proof the guard works. The AUTHORITATIVE proof is the C3 unit test on
# common._strip_scripts (it exercises the guard directly); the e2e below proves the
# guard is wired into the render path without breaking the document (job succeeds and
# visible content still renders). Satisfies: C3


def test_strip_scripts_removes_all_vectors():
    """_strip_scripts removes <script>/<iframe> content, on* handlers and
    javascript:/vbscript: URLs. This is the authoritative C3 guard test.
    Satisfies: C3
    """
    html = (
        '<div onmouseover="EVIL_ATTR()">BODY</div>'
        "<script>SCRIPT_BODY</script>"
        "<iframe>IFRAME_BODY</iframe>"
        '<a href="javascript:EVIL_JS()">JS_LINK</a>'
        '<a href="vbscript:EVIL_VB()">VB_LINK</a>'
    )
    out = C._strip_scripts(html)
    assert "SCRIPT_BODY" not in out
    assert "IFRAME_BODY" not in out
    assert "EVIL_ATTR()" not in out
    assert "EVIL_JS()" not in out
    assert "EVIL_VB()" not in out
    assert "onmouseover" not in out.lower()
    assert "javascript:" not in out.lower()
    assert "vbscript:" not in out.lower()


def test_strip_scripts_preserves_visible_and_safe_urls():
    """_strip_scripts leaves visible text and safe data:/https: references intact.
    Satisfies: C3
    """
    html = (
        "<p>VISIBLE_TEXT</p>"
        '<img src="'
        'AAAADElEQVR4nGP4z8AAAAMBAQDJ/pLvAAAAAElFTkSuQmCC" alt="local>"'
        '<a href="https://example.com/ok">SAFE_LINK</a>'
    )
    out = C._strip_scripts(html)
    assert "VISIBLE_TEXT" in out
    assert "SAFE_LINK" in out
    assert "https://example.com/ok" in out
    assert "data:image/png;base64," in out


def test_c3_html_guard_wired_job_done_and_content_preserved(client):
    """An .html upload with <script>, an on* handler and a javascript: link converts
    successfully (guard is wired into the render path) and the visible content is
    preserved. Satisfies: C3
    """
    html = (
        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>C3</title></head>"
        "<body>"
        "<script>SCRIPT_MARKER_TEXT</script>"
        "<div onmouseover='EVIL_MARKER'>VISIBLE_MAIN_TEXT</div>"
        '<a href="javascript:EVIL_LINK()">LINK</a>'
        "<p>SECOND_VISIBLE</p>"
        "</body></html>"
    )
    job = _upload(client, html, "xss.html")
    assert job["status"] == "done", job
    full = pdf_text(download_bytes(client, job["filename"]))
    # Guard must not blank the document: visible content still renders.
    assert "VISIBLE_MAIN_TEXT" in full
    assert "SECOND_VISIBLE" in full
    # Guarded vectors must not be reachable in the rendered document.
    assert "SCRIPT_MARKER_TEXT" not in full
    assert "EVIL_MARKER" not in full
    assert "EVIL_LINK" not in full


def test_c3_svg_guard_wired_job_done(client):
    """An .svg upload with a <script> converts successfully (guard is wired into the
    SVG render path, which also flows through common._strip_scripts).
    Satisfies: C3
    """
    svg = (
        '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">'
        "<script>SVG_SCRIPT_MARKER</script>"
        '<text x="10" y="50">SVG_VISIBLE_TEXT</text>'
        "</svg>"
    )
    job = _upload(client, svg, "xss.svg")
    assert job["status"] == "done", job